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SEARCH AND SEIZURE: UNDESIRABILITY OF
ILLINOIS EXCLUSIONARY RULE
LAWRENCE X. PUSATERI
ECENTLY, the Illinois Supreme Court was called upon to abolish
a rule of procedure adopted in Illinois some thirty-four years
ago which permits a defendant in a criminal action to make
a pre-trial motion to suppress evidence obtained in violation of the
constitutional prohibition against illegal search and seizure.' The asser-
tion was made that in view of the recent decision of the United States
Supreme Court in Wolf v. Colorado2 the fourteenth amendment to
the United States Constitution does not require states to exclude evi-
dence obtained by an unreasonable search and seizure, the constitu-
tional grounds which led to the adoption of the rule of exclusion have
disappeared, and the rule itself should be abolished.
The Illinois Supreme Court reasoned that the Wolf decision, al-
though holding that the states were not required to exclude such
evidence, nevertheless did not compel the introduction of such evi-
dence; the court ruled that the Illinois exclusionary rule would be
retained. In its decision the court, although acknowledging the Illinois
position as being in the minority,3 rejected the adoption of the major-
ity view 4 that permits the introduction of illegally obtained evidence
1 City of Chicago v. Lord, 7 M1. 2d 379, 130 N.E. 2d 504 (1955).
2 Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949).
3 The exclusionary rule has been adopted by the federal courts and in twenty-one
states, namely; California, Delaware, Florida, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Kentucky, Michi-
gan, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, North Carolina, Oklahoma, Oregon, South Dakota,
Tennessee, Texas, Washington, West Virginia, Wisconsin and Wyoming. Many of
the decisions in support of the above enumeration are to be found in the appendix to
Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 33 (1949).
4 The common law rule of admissibility is followed without qualification in twenty-
five states, namely; Arizona, Arkansas, Colorado, Connecticut, Georgia, Iowa, Kansas,
Louisiana, Maine, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, New
Jersey, New Mexico, New York, North Dakota, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island,
South Carolina, Utah, Vermont and Virginia. In Alabama and Maryland the admissi-
bility rule applies except in specific situations where the exclusionary rule is enacted
by statute. Many of the decisions in support of the above enumeration are to be found
in the appendix to Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 33 (1949).
MR. PUSATERI is an Assistant State's Attorney of Cook County, Illinois. He received
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and leaves the aggrieved party to find his remedy by way of civil
damages and criminal prosecution of the offender who conducted the
search.
It is significant to note that up to the tine of the decision in People
v. Brocamp,5 the Illinois courts had consistently held that relevant
evidence obtained in violation of the constitutional provisions against
unreasonable search and seizure was admissible in evidence. 6 It is not
the purpose of this discussion to enumerate and evaluate each of the
arguments for and against the exclusionary rule found in the Illinois
decisions and the decisions of other jurisdictions, but rather to discuss
and attempt to interpret some of the Illinois decisions in the light of
the present Illinois exclusionary rule.
The arguments for and against the rule were discussed extensively
in a learned opinion by Justice Cardozo wherein the New York Court
of Appeals unanimously decided against its adoption.7 Dean Wigmore
also enumerates these arguments in much detail, and concludes by
stating that the exclusion of such evidence is based upon "misguided
sentimentality."' He illustrates the result of the rule in the following
mythical narration:
Titus, you have been guilty of conducting a lottery; Flavius you have con-
fessedly violated the constitution. Titus ought to suffer imprisonment for crime
and Flavius for contempt. But no! We shall let you both go free. We shall not
punish Flavius directly but shall do so by reversing Titus' conviction. This is our
way of teaching people like Flavius to behave and of teaching people like Titus
to behave, and incidentally of securing respect for the constitution. Our way of
upholding the constitution is not to strike at the man who breaks it, but to let off
somebody who broke something else.9
It is submitted that a study of the Illinois decisions will reveal that
the present Illinois law of search and seizure is in an undesirable, un-
certain state. The exclusionary rule has been arbitrary in its applica-
tion and has introduced needless confusion into criminal law and
procedure. The many exceptions, refinements and distinctions that
have been granted the judicial blessings of the courts have largely
destroyed any value that the "rule" might otherwise have had. In
addition it appears that the decisions are neglecting to distinguish be-
5 307 M. 448, 138 N.E. 728 (1923).
6 People v. Paisley, 288 Ill. 310, 123 N.E. 573 (1919); Trask v. People, 151 111. 523, 38
N.E. 248 (1894); Siebert v. People, 143 Ill. 571, 32 N.E. 431 (1892); Gindrat v. People,
138 11. 103, 27 N.E. 1085 (1891).
7 People v. De Fore, 242 N.Y. 13, 150 N.E. 585 (1926).
8 Wigmore, Evidence, Vol. VIII, S 2184 (3d ed., 1940). 9 Ibid.
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tween constitutional protections and the totally distinct subject of a
procedural rule dealing with the admissibility of evidence.
PRELIMINARY RULES
It is the intention here to treat the decisions under specific subject
headings in so far as it is possible to so categorize them. However, by
way of leading into a study of the decisions, it is deemed necessary
to state a few introductory rules concerning search and seizure and
the motion to suppress. As to what constitutes a search, it has been
held that if the articles seized are in plain sight it is not an unlawful
search, for a search implies a "prying into hidden places for that
which is concealed, or an invasion and quest with some sort of force,
either actual or constructive, and it is not a search to observe that
which is open to view."'" The latter view is held true whether the
observation be in sunlight or by artificial light, such as a flashlight."
In regard to rules applying specifically to the motion to suppress,
it is first required that the motion be made in writing.12 In addition,
an accused person who wishes to avail himself of the exclusionary
rule must make a "timely" motion to suppress, and to be "timely" the
motion to suppress must be made before trial.'3 Failure to make the
motion before the commencement of the trial is held to waive the
right, and once the waiver has occurred, evidence obtained by an
unlawful search is admissible not only in the proceeding in which
the constitutional guaranty is waived, but in any and all subsequent
proceedings. 14
Thus a defendant's constitutional right to be protected against un-
lawful search land seizure is made to depend upon his raising the
question in a particular way at a specified time. The protection of a
citizen's constitutional rights becomes dependent upon a mere rule
of practice. As a matter of actual experience, what is happening in
the Illinois criminal courts today is that the clever criminal, or the
one able to afford skilled counsel is the one who can take advantage
10 People v. Marvin, 358 111. 426, 193 N.E. 202 (1934); People v. Patterson, 354 Ill. 313,
188 N.E. 417 (1933).
11 People v. Exum, 382 Ill. 204, 47 N.E. 2d 56 (1943).
12 People v. Mirbelle, 276 111. App. 533 (1934).
13 People v. Brocamp, 307 Ill. 448, 138 N.E. 728 (1923).
14 People v. Sovetsky, 343 Il. 583, 175 N.E. 844 (1931); In People v. Kissane, 347 Ill.
385, 179 N.E. 850 (1932), it was held that although the motion to suppress must be
made before trial, the court in its discretion may defer the hearing on the motion until
the evidence is offered on the trial.
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of this rule. The destitute lawbreaker or the innocent victim unfamil-
iar with court procedure loses his rights under the constitution be-
cause he did not proceed thus and so.
As to what property may be suppressed, the rule in Illinois is that
not only the physical evidence itself is excluded, but in addition no
derivative use can be made of evidence illegally seized. Thus if in-
criminating documents are illegally seized, not only is the use of the
documents outlawed, but also outlawed are any leads or information
that may have been derived from the documents such as the names
of witnesses. 5 Likewise it is held that a witness discovered as the
result of an illegal search of the defendant's home is not a competent
witness, and the fact that this witness testified to things that were,
antecedent to the arrival of the police who made the illegal search
does not establish her competency as a witness.16 The latter decision
is an obstacle to law enforcement and successful criminal prosecution,
for it is submitted that the competency and the inherent probative
value of the testimony of a witness are in no way effected by the
circumstances of her discovery.'
As a final preliminary consideration, it is to be noted that although
for the most part this discussion will be concerned with Illinois law,
frequent reference will be made to federal decisions which are per-
tinent. This is in accordance with the view of the Illinois Supreme
Court 18 that federal decisions definitely fixing a rule applying to the
introduction of evidence obtained by illegal seizure are very ap-
plicable, inasmuch as the guaranties of immunity from unreasonable
search and seizure contained in the federal Constitution 19 and the
Illinois Constitution ° are practically the same.
15 People v. Marvin, 382 Mll. 192, 46 N.E. 2d 997 (1943).
16 People v. Albea, 2 111. 2d 317, 118 N.E. 2d 277 (1954).
17 See also U.S. v. Arrington, 215 F. 2d 630 (C.A. 7th, 1954), where it was held that a
confession made during an illegal search cannot be relied upon in support of the legal-
ity of the search.
18 People v. Exum, 382 Ill. 204,47 N.E. 2d 56 (1943).
19 U.S. Const. Amend. 5:
"The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no warrants shall
issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly de-
scribing the place to be searched, and the person or things to be seized."
20 111. Const. Art. II, § 6 (1848):
"The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated; and no warrant shall
issue without probable cause, supported by affidavit, particularly describing the place
to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized."
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DEFENDANT MUST CLAIM AS HIS OWN THE
PROPERTY SOUGHT TO BE SUPPRESSED
In a number of Illinois decisions, exceedingly broad language is to
be found asserting an exception to the exclusionary rule to the effect
that a defendant in his motion to suppress must claim as his own the
property sought to be suppressed. Thus in People v. Pankey,21 the
court in affirming the trial court's denial of the motion to suppress
stated:
In view of the fact that plaintiff in error did not claim ownership of the prop-
erty seized, he is precluded from asserting that the seizure was unlawful, or to
complain of its use in evidence as being in violation of his constitutional rights.
The Supreme court of this state has repeatedly held that where a defendant dis-
claims ownership of property seized and does not seek its return to him, he
cannot complain of its seizure or of its use in evidence against him, for he is not
then in a position of giving evidence against himself.22
The above requirement of assertion of ownership is a logical limitation
imposed by the courts on the use of the preliminary motion to sup-
press. However, upon analysis of the decisions discussing this require-
ment, we find that the requirement of an allegation of ownership in
the motion to suppress is not one of general application, but in fact
is made to depend in great part upon ancillary considerations and
seemingly inconsequential distinctions.
The decisions are in agreement that where the property seized was
found as a result of a search of the automobile of the accused after
he has been lawfully arrested in his automobile, a motion to suppress
the evidence must contain a claim by the defendant that the property
sought to be suppressed is his own.2' An assertion of ownership is also
required for property found in a search of the defendant's automobile,
even though the defendant was not in the automobile at the time of
the arrest. Thus in People v. Tabet,24 where the defendants were
arrested in front of a store where a theft occurred, on suspicion of
stealing clothing, and information was found on them which led to
the discovery of their automobile where the stolen property was
found, the court affirmed the ruling that the motion to suppress would
not lie in that the defendants disclaimed ownership of the property
found.
21 349111. App. 303, 110 N.E. 2d 683 (1953). 22 Ibid., at 306 and 684.
23 People v. De Marios, 401 Ill. 146, 81 N.E. 2d 464 (1948); People v. Exum, 382 Ill.
204, 47 N.E. 2d 56 (1943); People v. Patterson, 354 111. 313, 188 N.E. 417 (1933).
24 402 111. 93, 83 N.E. 2d 329 (1949), cert. denied 336 U.S. 970 (1949).
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Allied with the above decisions, and yet not directly concerned
with the search of an automobile, is the decision of People v. Edge,25
in which the defendant had been arrested for violating a municipal
ordinance by obstructing an alley with his automobile and by failure
to have a safety inspection sticker. As he stepped out of his auto-
mobile, the arresting officer asked him about a bulge in one of his
rear pockets, at which time the defendant took out a package of
policy slips. The court ruled that since the defendant neither claimed
ownership nor demanded the return of the policy slips, he was in no
position to complain of their seizure or their use in evidence against
him.
An allegation of ownership in the motion to suppress is required
in those instances where the search and seizure takes place in a lodge
or club. 6 Where, however, the property sought to be suppressed is
found in the home of the defendant, the Illinois courts apply a dif-
ferent rule. Thus in People v. Grod, where the defendant was arrested
on a charge of burglary, and the following day the police went to
his home and searched it without a warrant and found bonds taken
in the burglary, the court ruled that the motion to suppress was prop-
erly sustained in spite of the fact that it did not allege that the prop-
erty seized belonged to the defendant. The court stated:
[t]here is a distinction between the search of a dwelling house without a war-
rant, and search of the person of the defendant or of the vehicle in which he is
riding, in that the first is unreasonable as a matter of law, [and may be suppressed
upon proof of illegal search without regard to the ownership of the property]
whereas the latter may depend on the particular circumstances of the case. 27
The Grod case has been cited as being in support of the proposition
that the search of a dwelling house without a warrant is unreasonable
as a matter of law s.2 This is clearly no longer a correct statement of
the law, at least where the defendant is home at the time of both the
arrest and incidental search of his home. Thus in People v. Clark,"
25 406 Ill. 490,94 N.E. 2d 359 (1950).
26 People v. Pankey, 349 Ill. App. 303, 110 NE. 2d 683 (1953).
27 385 11. 584, 592, 53 N.E. 2d 591, 595 (1944). But see People v. Gambino, 12 111. 2d 29
(Sept., 1957), where the defendant was arrested on the charge of robbery in front of
an apartment. The defendant stated he lived "right there" and the police went into the
apartment and there seized property identified as having been taken in the robbery.
The court therein stated: "Furthermore since the defendant neither claimed ownership
of the property alleged to have been illegally seized nor requested its return, he cannot
complain of its seizure or use in evidence against him."
28 People v. Kalpak, 10 Ill. 2d 411,140 N.E. 2d 726 (1957).
29 7 II. 2d 163, 130 N.E. 2d 195 (1955).
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a police informer made an unlawful purchase of narcotics in the de-
fendant's apartment. The police officers who were waiting for the
informer outside of the apartment house, immediately went up to the
defendant's room, broke into it, and arrested the defendant without
an arrest warrant, and searched his person and his room without a
search warrant.
The court in this case upheld the arrest and the search, made no
mention of the requirement of any warrant, and in fact appeared to
liberalize the requirements of a valid arrest by stating that it is only
necessary that the belief in the mind of the officer making the arrest
be such as to influence the conduct of a "reasonable and prudent man
under similar circumstances" and not that of a "prudent and cautious"
man as was formerly asserted by the decisions.8 0
However, in People v. Kalpak 3 the defendant was lawfully ar-
rested in his home while preparing to perform an illegal act upon a
disguised policewoman, but he was not at home at the time that the
actual search was conducted, for the officers immediately took him
to the police station. One hour and fifteen minutes later, while the
defendant was still in custody, an officer returned and the room was
searched. The room had been guarded by a police officer from the
time of the arrest to the time of the search. The court ruled the search
to be illegal and ordered a new trial.
This ruling is an unfortunate one, for it penalizes the administration
of justice merely because police officers took necessary precautions
to secure the immediate safe custody of a criminal. It is clear that
an incidental search conducted at the time of the arrest would have
been lawful. Similarly if the officers had returned with a search war-
rant, the search would have been lawful. But the law does not require
such a useless act. The officers had personal knowledge of the offense
committed in their presence a short time prior.
The United States Supreme Court has expressly held that merely
because the officers had time to procure a search warrant does not
mean that they are compelled to do so. Thus in United States v.
Rabinowitz,32 the police did not have a search warrant at the time of
30 People v. McGowan, 415 Ill. 375, 114 N.E. 2d 407 (1953); People v. Barg, 384 111.
172, 51 N.E. 2d 168 (1943); People v. Exum, 382 Ill. 204, 47 N.E. 2d 56 (1943). "Prudent
and cautious man" was reasserted as the test by the Illinois Supreme Court in a recent
decision. People v. Boozer, Docket No. 34372 (May, 1957).
31 10 111. 2d 411, 140 N.E. 2d 726 (1957).
32 339 U.S. 56 (1950).
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the valid arrest of the defendant in his home. The court in sustaining
the search of the home stated:
To the extent that Trupiano v. United States, 334 U.S. 699, requires a search
warrant solely upon the basis of the practicability of procuring it rather than
upon the reasonableness of the search after a lawful arrest, that case is overruled.
The relevant test is not whether it is reasonable to procure a search warrant, but
whether the search was reasonable. That criterion in turn depends upon the facts
and circumstances-the total atmosphere of the case. It is a sufficient precaution
that law officers must justify their conduct before courts which have always
been, and must be, jealous of the individual's right of privacy within the broad
sweep of the Fourth Amendment.33
The search conducted in the Kalpak case was a reasonable one under
all of the facts and circumstances, as stated above.
In People v. Duchant,34 the court ruled that an allegation of owner-
ship was not required even though the defendant was present in his
home at the time of the search. However, in People v. Reid,35 where
the defendant was arrested in his home on suspicion of robbery, and
the gun used in the robbery was found at this time, the court affirmed
a denial of the motion to suppress on the basis that it failed to allege
ownership and did not seek a return of the property. As its basis of
distinction the court stated that the defendant Reid at the time of the
search persisted in a disclaimer of ownership of the premises, and
insisted that he was merely a roomer.
It would appear that if the courts are to insist on applying greater
protections where the home is concerned, their willingness to do so
should not be made to depend on whether or not the defendant denies
the premises as his home at the time of the search. Such a denial would
seem to be a natural reaction of a guilty person to the questions of
arresting police officers, and if it is proved on the trial the home is in
fact that of the defendant, there is not a sufficient basis to penalize
the latter defendant.
In addition it may be asked on what basis such a preferential dis-
tinction is made in favor of the home of a defendant. A man's home
has been referred to as his castle, but experience has taught us that
in many instances it is a thieves' lair, a robber's den, or a dope ped-
dler's storeroom. A man's home surely is no more sacred than his
person.
A further example of the uncertainty created in this facet of the
law by the application of the motion to suppress is found in the de-
83 Ibid., at 66. 84 370 Ill. 650, 19 N.E. 2d 590 (1939).
85 336 111. 421, 168 N.E. 344 (1929).
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cision in People v. Mirbelle.36 The defendant was charged with the
offense of carrying a concealed weapon, which weapon was taken
from his person. He was allowed to make a motion to suppress in
spite of the fact that he testified that he had no gun and that the
gun was not taken from his person. The court stated:
"A defendant is entitled to the benefit of any defense shown by the entire evi-
dence, even if the facts on which such defense is based are inconsistent with the
defendant's own testimony." This is but a statement of the general law bearing
upon the subject.87
A closely related problem is concerned with the question of which
persons the courts will consider to have a sufficient interest so as to
be able to allege ownership in those instances where such an allegation
in the motion to suppress is required. An extraordinary decision in
this regard is found in the case of People v. Perry.88 The defendant
was the manager and president of a social club incorporated under
the laws of the state of Illinois as a nonprofit enterprise. He was
charged with the offense of illegal possession of slot machines, and
he sought to have suppressed these machines taken from the club. In
a seeming paradox the court ruled that the defendant Perry did have
sufficient custody and control of the machines to warrant conviction
for their unlawful possession, but did not have sufficient interest there-
in to enable him to raise the issue of unlawful search and seizure.
The decision in City of Chicago v. Lord 9 presents an analogous
factual situation. An owner of an arcade had just left the premises
when the police officers entered and seized obscene films. The defend-
ant Chertkoff remained on the premises; he was employed as a
"change man," making change for customers and reimbursing them
when a machine failed to work. The court held that the defendant
Chertkoff did have a sufficient interest to make the motion to suppress.
It was reasoned that he was in charge of the premises after Lord, the
owner, had departed, and that he had the right of possession of the
premises and of the films as against everyone other than Lord, and
that he must be permitted to assert that right of possession in an action
against him based upon evidence procured by the search.
Similarly, in People v. Martin,40 the defendant Kuder, an employee
of the defendant Martin, had made certain entries in books and rec-
86 276 IMl. App. 533 (1934). 87 Ibid., at 546.
8 1 Il. 2d 482, 116 N.E. 2d 360 (1953).
3 3 Il. App. 2d 410, 122 N.E. 2d 439 (1954), aff'd 7 I1. 2d 379, 130 N.E. 2d 504 (1955).
40 382 Ill. 192, 46 N.E. 2d 997 (1942).
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ords of Martin unlawfully seized by the police. The court held on a
motion by Kuder to suppress the evidence, that there was no merit
in the contention "that she was not interested in the papers because
she did not own them."
It would appear that the defendant Perry, as an employee as well
as an officer, had as much interest in the property of his employer
as did the employees Chertkoff and Kuder. The fact that the employ-
er in the Perry case was a corporation does not deprive Perry of his
position as an employee in possession within the meaning of the Lord
decision, and yet the motion to suppress was not made available to
him.
In all of the above instances, whether the evidence be found in the
automobile of the defendant, or upon his person, or in his home,
whether or not he disclaims it as his home or not, whether he is an
employee of a corporation or of a natural person, it cannot detract
from the probative value of the evidence on the main issue of proving
the guilt or innocence of the defendant. The rules of evidence are
designed to enable courts to reach the truth and in criminal cases, to
secure a fair trial to those accused of crime. Evidence obtained by
an illegal search and seizure is just as true and reliable as evidence
lawfully obtained. The court needs all reliable evidence material to
the issues before it to determine the guilt or innocence of the accused,
and how such evidence is obtained is not material to the primary issue
of innocence or guilt. The motion to suppress serves no purpose un-
der such circumstances other than to add confusion and uncertainty
to the law.
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT AGAINST ILLEGAL SEARCH AND SEIZURE
IS WAIVED IF DEFENDANT CONSENTS TO THE SEARCH
Another group of factual situations in which the Illinois courts
applying a liberal interpretation have reduced the number of in-
stances in which a motion to suppress will lie, is comprised of cases
in which a defendant is deemed to have consented to the search. It
is a well settled rule that one who consents to a search of his prop-
erty waives his constitutional right to complain that the search and
seizure were unlawful.41 The general rule applies, not only to a search
of the defendant's person and car, but in addition, if the defendant
consents to a search of his home, it is a lawful search even if he is
41 People v. Mathews, 406 Ill. 35, 92 N.E. 2d 147 (1950); People v. Schmoll, 383 111.
280, 48 N.E. 2d 933 (1943); People v. Mizzano, 360 Ill. 446, 196 N.E. 439 (1935).
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not home at the time of the search.4 2 In those instances, where the
evidence is in direct conflict as to whether or not there was in fact
a consent to search, it is for the trial court to determine which wit-
nesses are telling the truth.43
Although, generally, the defendant's consent is held to arise by his
language and conduct, exercised at the time of the search,44 or by a
written consent signed by the defendant,45 it has also been held that
the defendant's consent may arise through a statutory enactment gov-
erning his occupation. Thus in People v. Allen,46 where the defendant
was in the auto sales business and was licensed by the state of Illinois
to deal in used cars, it was held that under the Uniform Motor Ve-
hicle Anti-Theft Act,47 as a condition of his license, he was deemed
to have granted authority to any peace officer to examine his records,
motor vehicles, or parts and accessories at his place of business at any
reasonable time during the day or night.48
In regard to the limit of the search, once the consent is given, the
rule is the same as in those situations where search warrants are
employed; it is thus held that there is no right to search beyond the
limit prescribed in the consent to search.49 Also, if the search warrant
is void, a person is not bound to know that the warrant is illegal and
need not object to it and resist its execution at the risk of being held
to have consented to the search. 50
Generally, a subterfuge and deceit employed by the arresting offi-
cers in obtaining the consent to search vitiates the consent.5' Hence,
where the police officers obtained entrance into the premises by false-
ly pretending that they were housemen employed by the hotel in
which the defendant lived, the resulting search was ruled illegal, as
42 People v. Polenik, 407 Ill. 337, 95 N.E. 2d 414 (1950).
43 People v. Levy, 370 Ill. 82, 17 N.E. 2d 967 (1938); People v. McDonald, 365 111. 233,
6 N.E. 2d 182 (1936); People v. Reid, 336 Ill. 421,168 N.E. 344 (1929).
44 People v. Mathews, 406 Ill. 35, 92 N.E. 2d 147 (1950); People v. Wetherington, 348
M.310, 180N.E. 843 (1932).
45 People v. Rogers, 8111. 2d 279, 133 N.E. 2d 16 (1956).
46407 Ill. 596,96 N.E. 2d 446 (1950), cert. denied 341 U.S. 922 (1951).
47111. Rev. Star. (1949) c.951, S 85.
48 In People v. Levy, 370 Ill. 82, 17 N.E. 2d 967 (1938), the court had this same statute
to construe. It held that the evidence itself was sufficient to show consent.
49 People v. Schmoll, 383 Ill. 280,48 N.E. 2d 933 (1943).
50 People v.Reid, 315 Ill. 597, 146 N.E. 504 (1925).
51 People v. Dalpe, 371 111. 607, 21 N.E. 2d 756 (1939); People v. Chatman, 322 111.
App. 519, 54 N.E. 2d 631 (1944).
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being obtained without consent.5 2 However, a slightly different view
as to trickery and ruse was adopted by a federal decision wherein
the court said:
The fact that the police officers obtained the keys to Keating's truck from
him by means of a ruse does not make the use of said keys illegal. As the district
court observed at the trial, police officers are not required to be too polite. They
may match wits with alleged criminals, and in the absence of coercive, abusive
tactics, obtain evidence for use in the prosecution. 53
Where the search is obtained by the officer without force, fraud,
or trickery, the consent is generally held to constitute a waiver of
the defendant's constitutional rights.5 4 In People v. Dent,55 officers
went to the home of the defendant suspecting her, at that time, of
running a policy game. They rang the bell at her home, and someone
in the house said, "Come in," whereupon the officers entered and
found the defendant and a woman companion seated at a table upon
which there was policy material. The defendant denied giving the
invitation to enter, but admitted that her companion did so. The court
ruled that this constituted an illegal search and seizure, stating that
even though the invitation to enter was made in the presence of the
defendant, the evidence does not establish that the invitation was
extended with the permission of the defendant, and the gist of the act
of invitation is that it must be extended upon specific authorization.
It is difficult to see how the court sustained the motion to suppress
under the above circumstances. It is submitted that the facts of the
case show clearly that there was not a search within the meaning of
the prior decisions of the court, holding that a search implies a probing
into hidden places for that which is concealed. 6 In this instance, the
policy matter was lying open to view upon the table. Concerning the
possibility of illegal entrance, Justice Stone, in his dissent, reasons
logically that since the householder has a right to inquire who is
seeking admission to his home, the holding of the majority opinion
that permission to enter, given in ignorance of the identity and pur-
pose of those seeking admission, renders such entrance illegal, not
52 People v. Dalpe, 371 Ill. 607, 21 N.E. 2d 756 (1939).
53 U.S. v. O'Brien, 174 F. 2d 341, 345 (C.A. 7th, 1949).
54 In United States v. Mitchell, 322 U.S. 65 (1944), the Supreme Court approved on
disputed evidence a finding of consent to search in a case where the consent was ob-
tained while the defendant was in the custody of police officers.
55 371 Ill. 33, 19 N.E. 2d 1020 (1939).
56 Authorities cited note 10 supra.
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only is an unreasonable restriction upon officers of the law, unneces-
sary to preserve the constitutional safeguards of the citizen, but puts
a premium upon such a plea of ignorance since, no matter how false
the plea, it is impossible of refutation.57
In a recent decision by the Illinois Supreme Court,57 a the facts dis-
closed that a police informer made a purchase of narcotics in the
defendant's apartment. Police officers were waiting for the informer,
and after determining that the substance he had was a narcotic, they
accompanied the informer back to the apartment. They rapped for
admittance, whereupon a lady's voice inside the apartment asked who
it was. The informer answered that it was he, whereupon the woman,
a companion of the defendant, opened the door, admitting the in-
former and the police officers. The defendant was sitting on the
apartment couch, and the informer identified him to the police as the
man from whom the narcotics had been purchased.
The defendant was then placed under arrest and upon his person
was found money which had been given to the informer by the police
officers earlier in the evening, the serial numbers having been re-
corded. The defendant contended that the money found upon his
person at the time of the arrest was taken by an illegal seizure since
no search warrant had been procured. The court, making no ref-
erence to the Dent decision, sustained the search.
A related problem occurs where the accused is alleged to have been
coerced to consent to the search. In People v. McGurn,5" the police
jumped upon the defendant who was sitting in a taxicab and told him
to keep his hands away from his pockets. They then commenced to
feel his side and his stomach whereupon the defendant stated, "You
will find it on the right side." The statement was held not to constitute
a waiver of the defendant's constitutional right, but was rather a
submission to the officers supposed authority for the purpose of pre-
vention of further violence.
The above reasoning was not applied, however, in People v. Pres-
ton,59 wherein the defendant was lawfully arrested on grounds of
murder. In the presence of the police, the sheriff, and an assistant
state's attorney, he was told to let down his trousers and expose his
57 People v. Dent, 371111. 33, 35, 19 N.E. 2d 1020, 1021 (1939).
57a People v. Faulkner, Docket No. 34367, 10 May 1957.
58 341 Ill. 632, 173 N.E. 754 (1930).
59 341 Ill. 407, 173 N.E. 383 (1930).
DE PAUL LAW REVIEW
underwear, which he did, disclosing a blood stained shirt and under-
clothes, which were later introduced as evidence against him at the
trial. The court held the above constituted a valid search. It would
appear that a person in police custody, surrounded by law enforce-
ment officers has as equally submitted to authority as one who dis-
closes where a weapon is to a police officer who is searching his per-
son. In both instances an implied official coercion is present.
An interesting set of facts was presented in a very recent Illinois
Supreme Court decision.5oa The defendant was arrested by an officer
with an arrest warrant while the defendant was standing in his apart-
ment house on the stairs leading from the first-floor vestibule to the
second floor. When the arresting officer started to read the warrant
to the defendant at her apartment door, which was standing open,
the defendant said: "Come on inside; the neighbors upstairs will hear
you." The court held that the entry into the apartment was lawful,
and as to all articles that were in plain view ". . . there was no un-
lawful search since the officers were in the apartment at the invitation
of the defendant. ' '59b
The problem of implied coercion also arises in those instances
where it is necessary to determine whether the consent of a third
person is binding on the defendant so as to waive the latter's constitu-
tional privileges. Thus in People v. Lind,0 the court asserted the
general proposition that the constitutional barrier to unreasonable
search and seizure can be waived by the person whose rights are
invaded or by someone specifically authorized to act for him in the
matter. However, in this case, the court held that even if the defend-
ant's wife possessed the authority to waive his constitutional rights,
she was in a highly nervous state because of the recent arrest of her
husband, and the request to search the premises by the officer was
thus so tinged with coercion that it could not be said to have been
freely given, and thus she cannot be said to have waived her husband's
constitutional rights.
In People v. Mizzano,6 in a similar factual situation, the wife of
one of the defendants answered the door. The officers told her that
59a People v. Heidman, 11111. 2d 501, 144 N.E. 2d 580 (May, 1957).
59b Ibid., at 585.
60 370 111. 131, 18 N.E. 2d 189 (1938).
61 360 Il. 446, 196 N.E. 439 (1935).
SEARCH AND SEIZURE
they were police officers and that they had information that stolen
goods were in her home. The court held:
There was no evidence of an unlawful search. While the officers did not have
a search warrant, they had been informed that stolen property was to be found
in that building and searched the premises with the consent of Mrs. Scallati.62
This decision does not appear to be in agreement with the Lind ruling.
As a possible basis of distinction, the court stated that the property
seized was not offered in evidence. However, the company's inventory
of the property was offered and received in evidence and the officers
were allowed to testify as to what they found, all of which evidence
should have been held inadmissible if the search and seizure were
declared unlawful.
A recent Illinois decision 63 presented an interesting set of facts. A
husband and wife had a family quarrel in which the husband assaulted
the wife with a weapon. The wife invited the officers to search for
the weapon on the premises jointly owned and occupied by her and
her husband. The husband sought to suppress the introduction of the
weapon in evidence, alleging that the consent of the wife to search
the premises could not act as a waiver of his constitutional privileges.
The court denied the motion to suppress, stating that where two
persons have equal rights to the use or occupancy of the premises,
either may consent to a search and the evidence thus disclosed can
be used against either. It was pointed out that in this instance the wife
was not acting as an agent for her husband, but acting in her own
right as an occupant of the premises.
Similarly, it has been held that a woman can consent to a search of
premises against a man she is living with where the house is under
joint ownership and control.64 Also, the consent of one counterfeiter
waives the constitutional right of the other partner where they have
equal rights to the use and possession of the premises." It has, an addi-
tion, been held that the rights of an employee roomer can be waived
by the employer who is the owner of the house.6 These latter de-
cisions are in conformity with the judicial trend which tends to carve
out new exceptions to the exclusionary rule and thus to avoid the
application of the rule in favor of an unworthy defendant.
62 Ibid., at 449 and 440.
63 People v. Sharnbley, 4 Ill. 2d 38, 122 N.E. 2d 172 (1954).
64 Stein v. U.S., 166 F. 2d 851 (C.A. 7th, 1948).
65 U.S. v. Sferas, 210 F. 2d 69 (C.A. 7th, 1954); cert. denied 347 U.S. 933 (1954).
66 Milyoncio v. U.S., 53 F. 2d 937 (C.A. 7th, 1931); cert. denied 286 U.S. 551 (1931).
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CONCEALED WEAPONS CASES
The impropriety and incongruity resulting from the application of
the Illinois exclusionary rule become most apparent when applied to
the specific criminal offense of carrying a concealed weapon. The
pertinent provision of the Illinois statute relating to concealed weap-
ons states:
No person shall carry concealed on or about his person a pistol, revolver or
other firearm .... 67
It has been held in this regard that before there can be a conviction
under this statute there must be proof that the firearm is covered in
such a manner as to give no notice of its presence,68 or that it at least
be concealed from ordinary observation. 9 Moreover, the general rule
has been asserted by the Illinois courts that discovery of the weapon
after the arrest of the defendant cannot relate back to and operate
as a justification of the arrest, and therefore a motion to suppress will
lie to prevent the introduction of the weapon in evidence.
70
The practical effect of the application of the above rules by the
Illinois courts is to make a criminal practically immune from arrest
for the offense of carrying a concealed weapon upon his person. The
only instance in which an accused can be convicted for the latter
offense is when he has been lawfully arrested on reasonable grounds
for believing he is guilty of a different offense and the incidental
lawful search of his person reveals a concealed weapon.7 '
The facts in People v. Ford72 clearly illustrate the above situation.
In this case a deputy sheriff saw the defendant, a reputed member of
a known criminal gang sitting in an automobile in front of a road-
house on the outskirts of the city of Chicago. The deputy was under
the instructions of his superior officer to apprehend any member of
this gang for questioning with respect to the abduction of one Jake
Factor. He arrested the defendant without a warrant and after making
the arrest, searched him, and discovered an automatic pistol on his
6 7 Ill. Rev. Stat. (1955) c. 38, S 155.
68 People v. Niemoth, 322 Ill. 51, 152 NE. 537 (1926).
69 People v. Euctice, 371 l1. 159, 20 N.E. 2d 83 (1939).
70 People v. Ford, 356 111. 572, 191 N.E. 315 (1934); People v. Humphreys, 353 111. 340,
187 N.E. 446 (1933); People v. Macklin, 353 Ill. 64, 186 N.E. 531 (1933); People v.
McGurn, 341 Ill. 632, 173 N.E. 754 (1930).
71 People v. Euctice, 371 Ill. 159, 20 N.E. 2d 83 (1939); People v. Kissane, 347 Il. 385,
179 N.E. 850 (1931).
72 356 Ill. 572, 191 N.E. 315 (1934).
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person. The court admitted that it was manifest from the evidence
that the defendant was committing the offense of carrying a concealed
weapon at the time he was arrested. Nevertheless, a motion to sup-
press the weapon as evidence was sustained and the defendant dis-
charged.
Similarly, in People v. Henneman,3 the defendant was arrested as
he was walking into a tavern, under what the police officer believed
to be suspicious circumstances. The officer followed him into the
tavern and arrested him, brought him out on the sidewalk, searched
him and found a .32 caliber pistol in his possession. He was convicted
of the offense of carrying a concealed weapon. The Illinois Supreme
Court ruled that the trial court erred in denying the motion to sup-
press the weapon as evidence. The court stated:
This court has repeatedly held that the fact that it develops after an invalid
arrest, that the person arrested is carrying concealed weapons, does not justify
the arrest, and an officer making such arrest without a warrant must, as ground
for his belief that the person arrested is guilty of a crime or implicated therein,
have information of some facts which would indicate and influence a prudent,
cautious man under the circumstances. 74
The above decisions appear to be diametrically opposed to the
Illinois Supreme Court declaration that the constitutional limitation
on searches and seizures was primarily intended as a shield to the
innocent rather than a refuge for the guilty.7 This, then, is an in-
stance where the constitutional provision is distorted by extending
the meaning so as to defeat the ends of justice.
The reasoning applied in the above decisions was to the effect that
the officer had neither knowledge nor information that the defendant
had committed any criminal offense and the discovery of the weapon
cannot relate back to and operate as a justification for the arrest. The
court's statement to the effect that the officer had neither knowledge
nor information that the defendant had committed any ciriminal
offense was made to refute any contention that the arrest was valid
under the first section of paragraph 657 of the Illinois Criminal Code76
as an arrest made by an officer for a criminal offense committed in his
presence.
73 373 111. 603, 27 N.E. 2d 448 (1940).
74 Ibid., at 606 and 449.
75 People v. Exum, 382 Ill. 204, 47 N.E. 2d 56 (1943); People v. Marvin, 358 Ill. 426,
193 N.E. 202 (1934).
76 Ill. Rev. Stat. (1955) c. 38 § 657.
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A closer examination of the statute reveals that it only requires that
the offense be committed in the presence of the officer and not in his
sight or view. Thus, what the Illinois courts are doing in these instances
is formulating a new process of reading into the Illinois statute the
requirement that the officer have knowledge of the commission of the
offense communicated to him through his sense of sight, for surely
under a literal interpretation of the statute the defendants in both the
Ford and Henne-man cases were committing the offense of carrying a
concealed weapon in the presence of the officers.
Sight will be the only one of the senses applicable in these instances,
for normally a weapon cannot be tasted or heard or smelt, and touch-
ing is eliminated in that a touching for the purpose of ascertaining the
presence of a concealed weapon is itself an unlawful search. To pro-
ceed to a ridiculous end, we see that we must place a further limitation
on the sense of sight. Presumably sight must be confined to those
instances where a bulge occurs in the clothing and that bulge is seen
by the officer, using his sense of sight as a prudent and cautious man
under the circumstances, and he recognizes that bulge to be in the
shape of a weapon, for the gravaman of the offense is concealment
and if the weapon is visible to eyesight or ordinary observation it is
not concealed.17
The Illinois Supreme Court has stated that the enactment of a law
against carrying concealed weapons is aimed at persons of criminal
instincts and for the prevention of crime. 8 This same court has stated
that the object of the legislature in the passage of the Concealed
Weapons Act was to protect the public against the occurrence of
assaults, affrays and crimes of violence, which are encouraged by the
general and promiscuous carrying of concealed weapons. 79 It is hard
to reconcile the above statements of the court with the Illinois deci-
sions concerning the carrying of concealed weapons. The effect of
such decisions is to render the statute nugatory in those instances
where the weapon is concealed on the person of the defendant.
How much more consistent was the attitude expressed by the Illi-
77 Authorities cited notes 68 and 69 supra.
78 People v. Liss, 406 Ill. 419,94 N.E. 2d 320 (1950).
79People v. Saltis, 328 Ill. 494, 160 N.E. 86 (1927), appeal dismissed 277 U.S. 575
(1928). In this case the admission into evidence of the revolver found on the person of
the defendant after the arrest was held not to have deprived the defendant o his con-
stitutional rights where the testimony of the witness to the effect that the defendant
had a concealed revolver on his person was received without objection.
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nois Supreme Court in People v. Garwood,8" where the defendant
had been convicted of carrying a concealed weapon. The court held
that the defendant by taking the case to the appellate court had waived
the constitutional question of illegal search and seizure. The court
used some strong but consistently fitting language in stating:
They are clearly guilty of the offense charged and they should consider them-
selves fortunate that the penalty imposed was not much heavier. 8'
ARREST AND INCIDENTAL SEARCH AND SEIZURE
WITHOUT BENEFIT OF WARRANT
The situation here presented is that in which an arrest is made by
an officer without an arrest warrant, and he proceeds to conduct an
incidental search without benefit of a search warrant. Where the
arrest is justified, the accompanying search without a search warrant
is also justified, and evidence taken as a result of such incidental search
is admissible. s2 Conversely, if the arrest is unlawful, the property
taken as a result of the search incident thereto is not admissible in
evidence upon a motion to suppress it.s3 Thus the primary consid-
eration becomes that of determining what is a valid arrest. Paragraph
657 of the Illinois Criminal Code provides:
An arrest may be made by an officer or by a private person without warrant,
for a criminal offense committed or attempted in his presence, and by an officer,
when a criminal offense has in fact been committed, and he has reasonable
grounds for believing that the person to be arrested has committed it.84
As to what physical acts of the arresting individual are necessary
to actually effect an arrest, it may be stated generally that arrest
imports an actual restraint or detention. Manual touching is not nec-
essary where the subject submits to the arrest or is otherwise actually
subjected to restraint.85 In addition to the authority of the arresting
person as prescribed by the above statute, and his intention to arrest,
which intention is understood by the one arrested, there must be an
actual restraint of the person, a restriction of his right of locomotion.8
80 317 111. 578, 148 NE. 259 (1925).
81 Ibid., at 580 and 259.
82 People v. Clark, 9 111. 2d 400, 137 N.E. 2d 820 (1956); People v. Roberta, 352 Ill.
189, 185 N.E. 253 (1933).
83 People v. Galloway, 7 Ill. 2d 527, 131 N.E. 2d 474 (1956); People v. Ford, 356 .
572, 191 N.E. 315 (1934).
84 Ill. Rev. Stat. (1957) c. 38, S 657.
85 People v. Mirbelle, 276 11. App. 533 (1934). 86 Ibid., at 540.
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The case of People v. Scalisi s7 provides an excellent example of the
importance of the distinction between an arrest for questioning which
is clearly unlawful, and the action of an officer in stopping a person
for the purpose of questioning him, which is clearly permissible.
Police officers saw the defendants riding in a Cadillac car at 9:00 A.M.,
became suspicious, and followed the car. When the car stopped, the
police approached it, gun play ensued, and an officer was killed. The
defendants were convicted of murder. The Supreme Court of Illinois,
in reversing the conviction of the defendants, placed much emphasis
on what they termed the illegality of the attempted arrest.
If the court had determined from the evidence that the officers, as
they approached the car, had not intended to arrest the defendants
for questioning but had merely intended to question them without
putting them under arrest, unless their questioning of the defendants
should reveal some crime, the aspect of illegal arrest might well have
been removed from consideration. Of course other considerations
enter into the question of whether or not the conviction would have
been sustained. But the right of the officers to so stop and question
the defendants was set out in People v. Henneman, 8 where the court
stated:
That the officers had a right to stop and question plaintiff in error and his
companion cannot be doubted, and if there were disclosed by such questioning,
facts which would tend to establish suspicion that plaintiff in error was engaged
in or had been guilty of a crime, his arrest, made as a result of such belief on the
part of the officers, would be a legal arrest and a search following such an arrest
would not be an unreasonable search.89
Thus in the Scalisi decision, of paramount importance was the de-
termination of the intent of the officers. The court stated that the
testimony of Conway, the leader of the squad, showed conclusively
the officers intent to arrest. Excerpts from the decision reveal that
Conway testified in part as follows:
... That when his squad was pulling up to where the cars finally came to a stop,
and as he was getting out of the car and started to approach the Cadillac, it was
his purpose and intention to interrogate the men in the Cadillac car and at that
time to detain them for a length of time until satisfied as to who they were; that
at the time he turned around and followed the Cadillac car it was his intention
to stop them and find out who they were, and detain them long enough to
question them .... 90
87 324 Ill. 131, 154 N.E. 715 (1926).
88 367 Ill. 151, 10 N.E. 2d 649 (1937). 89 Ibid., at 154 and 650.
90 People v. Scalisi, 324 Ill. 131, 138; 154 N.E. 715, 718 (1926).
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The above evidence is not inconsistent with an intent to stop and
question. In any event, the testimony of Conway does not appear to
show conclusively the intent to arrest for questioning. The question
of restraint of physical locomotion and other acts necessary to con-
stitute an arrest would also be pertinent to this inquiry.
There is a fine line as to when a stopping by an officer of an in-
dividual will in and of itself constitute an arrest. Police officers have
the right to stop and question persons where their duty calls for them
to do so. In the absence of evidence of a flagrant abuse by the officers,
this right to stop and question should be construed liberally to the
advantage of the representative of the people who in many instances
is risking his life in so acting. This is especially true where the officer
is merely approaching the defendants at the time he is fired upon.
As to an arrest by a private person, the rules are clear and the
statute is construed literally. He may arrest only when an offense is
committed or attempted in his presence, and he may not arrest an-
other private person on probable cause or because he has reasonable
grounds to believe such person to be guilty of a crime which has been
committed.' If a private person does so arrest, he will be guilty of
trespass if no criminal offense was committed or attempted in his
presence, whether or not he had probable cause to believe the arrested
person guilty.92
Regarding the situation where an officer arrests pursuant to the
statutory provision that a criminal offense has in fact been committed,
and he has reasonable grounds for believing that the person to be
arrested has committed the offense, the problems become more com-
plex. The term "criminal offense" within the meaning of the Illinois
Arrest Act includes not only felonies, but misdeameanors as well.
Thus in People v. Clark93 and People v. Edge," it was held that a
search incident to an arrest for a parking violation or violation of a
municipal traffic ordinance would be justified, and that it was im-
material whether or not the charge was sustained, or even whether
the defendant was ever charged with the minor violation. The above
holdings deal directly with an offense committed in the presence of
the officer and represent a liberal view of the court in sustaining an
91 Enright v. Gibson, 219 I11. 550, 76 N.E. 689 (1906).
92 Schramko v. Boston Store of Chicago, 243 Ill. App. 251 (1927); Sundmacher v.
Block, 39 Ill. App. 553 (1890).
93 9 Ill 2d 400, 137 N.E. 2d 820 (1956).
94 406 Ill. 490, 94 N.E. 2d 359 (1950).
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arrest on a minor charge, when there is a strong indication that the
arresting officer suspected the defendant of a more serious offense at
the time he made the arrest for the traffic violation. In both instances,
the incidental search disclosed evidence of the more serious offenses,
and the defendants were convicted of said offenses with the aid of
such evidence, while the minor offenses that were used to sustain the
arrest, were completely ignored after such use.95
The most serious problems arise in this area, where the offense is
not committed in the presence of the officer, but he nevertheless ar-
rests a person for that offense without an arrest warrant. The decisions
do not present us with a general rule as to what is or is not reasonable
grounds for such an arrest within the meaning of the statute. It is
generally stated that reasonable grounds for making the arrest is al-
ways a mixed question of law and fact, and that each case must be
considered and decided upon its own set of facts.96
By way of preliminary consideration, we may observe that state-
ments of opposite extremes frequently appear in the decisions. On the
one hand it has been stated that an arrest by an officer on bare suspi-
cion is not a valid arrest.97 On the other, the statement appears that
what is in fact required by the statute is that the officer's ground for
belief that the person to be arrested is guilty of a crime must be such
as would influence the conduct of a prudent and cautious man under
the circumstances.9
A study of the decisions concerned with Illinois law reveals that the
interpretation by the courts of similar as well as contrasting factual
situations has been seemingly inconsistent to the extent that even if the
officer were a trained attorney familiar with each of the decisions, he
would not be able to determine with reasonable certainty whether or
not the facts surrounding the arrest which he is contemplating are suf-
ficient to sustain it legally. The problem becomes even more difficult
for the ordinary officer, totally unfamiliar with judicial requirements.
95 See U.S. v. Lefkowitz, 285 U.S. 452 (1932) in support of the proposition that an
arrest may not be used as a pretext to search for evidence.
96 Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925); People v. Kissane, 347 Ill. 385, 179
N.E. 850 (1932).
9 7 People v. Gallaway, 7 Ill. 2d 527, 131 N.E. 2d 474 (1957); People v. De Luca, 343
I11. 269, 175 N.E. 370 (1939); People v. Chatman, 322 Ill. App. 519, 54 N.E. 2d 631 (1944).
9s People v. Derrico, 409 111. 453, 100 N.E. 2d 607 (1951); People v. Euctice, 371 Il1.
159, 20 N.E. 2d 83 (1939); People v. Brown, 354 Ill. 480, 188 N.E. 529 (1933); People
v. Marklin, 353 Il. 64, 186 N.E. 531 (1933); People v. Kissane, 347 Ill. 385, 179 N.E. 850
(1932).
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It has been stated that the bad reputation of the defendant, or his
reputation for being a hoodlum, standing alone, is not sufficient to
justify an arrest, and is in fact an arrest based on mere suspicion. Thus
in People v. Ford,9 the defendant was arrested while seated in an
automobile which was parked in front of a roadhouse on the outskirts
of Chicago. The officer testified that he was acting under the instruc-
tions of his superior officer to apprehend any member of the Touhy
gang in connection with the abduction of one Jake Factor. The de-
fendant was arrested and searched, and an automatic pistol was found
on him. The court in reversing the conviction for carrying a con-
cealed weapon stated:
The officer however had neither knowledge nor information that the plaintiff
in error had committed any criminal offense. The evidence discloses that he was
arrested solely because he was reputed to be a member of a certain body of men
suspected of being implicated in the kidnaping of Factor.100
In People v. Kissane,1°1 police officer William Drury arrested the
defendant Anthony Kissane, otherwise known as Red Kissane, a per-
son of no little reputation, whom this same officer had arrested before.
Drury said that his reason for arresting the defendant was that he had
received a description of a man at a roll call who had held up a bank
two days before. He testified that he came to the conclusion that Kis-
sane answered the description, and he arrested him on the street,
searched him, and found a weapon in his jacket. Kissane was not the
perpetrator of the robbery, was never formally charged with the bank
robbery and was released from jail about five hours after his arrest.
The court sustained the above arrest, and the defendant was con-
victed of the offense of carrying a concealed weapon.
The above decisions are not without their similarities. It is submit-
ted, however, that the conclusions reached in the above cases do not
add certainty to the law of arrest, especially in the mind of the ordi-
nary police officer.
Seeming uncertainty is to be found in the Illinois decisions dealing
with the arrest of one who is found in the presence of another person
who is lawfully arrested. The question becomes one of determining
whether mere physical presence of the former person with the one
lawfully arrested is sufficient to show that the former is also impli-
cated in a criminal offense. If independent acts are being performed
09 356 I11. 572,191 N.E. 315 (1934). 100 Ibid., at 576 and 317.
101 347 111. 385, 179 N.E. 850 (1932).
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by the person who is present with the one lawfully arrested, such acts
may be sufficient to implicate the former in the offense. Thus in
People v. McGowan,10 2 the police officers observed one Dawkins
carry a bag that was open in such a manner that the policy slips could
be seen. The defendant McGowan was seen to emerge from the build-
ing carrying a bag of similar type and appearance. The court in sus-
taining the arrest stated:
... We believe such facts were sufficient to justify the belief of a prudent and
cautious man that McGowan was likewise implicated in the offense and that the
bag carried by him also contained policy slips. Under such circumstances we
must conclude that the arrest of Thomas McGowan and the search made inci-
dent thereto were justified under the law.103
In People v. Galloway,0 a police informer named Gladden made a
purchase of narcotics from one Galloway; the purchase was made a
few blocks away from the point where the police officers were wait-
ing for the informer to return. The defendant Jones was with the de-
fendant Galloway at the time of the sale to Gladden, and Jones actu-
ally supplied the narcotics to Galloway in the presence of Gladden.
However, when Gladden returned to the police, he neglected to men-
tion Jones, and he gave the police a description of Galloway only.
The police proceeded to the place of the sale and arrested Galloway
and Jones, who was still present with Galloway at the time of the
arrest. The court sustained the arrest of Galloway. In holding the
arrest of Jones illegal, it stated:
From Gladden's testimony it appears that he did not know or describe Jones,
nor did he tell officers Smith and Wright how many men he had dealt with.
Galloway was arrested because Gladden described him to Officer Smith follow-
ing the alleged purchase. The officer, therefore, must have had a reasonable
belief that Galloway had committed an offense, but he could not have had a
reasonable and well founded belief as to Jones's participation in the alleged
crime. Jones was arrested merely because he was found in the presence of Gal-
loway, and this could not make the Jones arrest lawful.10 5
This reasoning was not applied by the Illinois Supreme Court in
People v. Euctice.00 In this case Illinois police had received a radio
call from Indiana police that a robbery and murder had been com-
mitted in Indiana and the killers were proceeding on Route 66 to Illi-
nois. The officers had stopped the car of the defendants because one
102 415 111.375,114 N.E. 2d 407 (1953). 10 5 Ibid., at 535 and 478.
103 Ibid., at 382 and 410. 10 371 111. 159, 20N.E. 2d 83 (1939).
104 7 111. 2d 527, 131 N.E. 2d474 (1956).
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of them was said to answer the description of the men given in the
radio call. The court in sustaining the arrest and search and seizure of
all of the defendants in the car stated:
Euctice was said to have answered the description of one of the men given in
the radio call. Under such circumstances, the arrest was lawful, and the officers
had a right to search defendants without a search warrant, for in such case the
right of search and seizure is incidental to the right to arrest .... 107
It becomes even more difficult to rationalize the above holdings
when it is considered that in the Galloway case, Jones was in fact
guilty of the offense he was arrested for, while in the Euctice case, it
was later shown that the defendants had no connection with the Indi-
ana offenses, and they were convicted only for the offense of carrying
concealed weapons in the automobile that was stopped by the police.
In People v. Derrico,108 the court sustained the arrest of the de-
fendant who was in a car with one Hrabina at the time that the latter
was lawfully arrested for burglary. The court, in holding that the
facts were sufficient to engender in the mind of the officer "as a pru-
dent and cautious man, a belief that the defendant was implicated in
the robbery" placed much emphasis on the presence of the defendant
in the car with Hnabina and the fact that a safe moved in the burglary
could not have been moved by one man. It is submitted that the above
facts are not considered sufficient for a lawful arrest of the defendant
Derrico, when it is considered that the burglary had occurred over
two months prior to the date of the arrest and at a distance from the
scene of the arrest.
In People v. Henrneman,109 a filling station had been held up by two
men in a black car. On the very next day and at a distance of only
two miles away, the defendant was arrested, searched, and found to
be carrying a concealed weapon. On the trial for the latter offense,
the officers testified that they thought that the man who was in the
black car with the defendant immediately prior to the defendant's
arrest, answered the description of the man who actually committed
the robbery. The court held that the above facts did not justify a
reasonable belief that the defendant Henneman was in any way impli-
cated in the crime.
107 Ibid., at 162 and 85.
108409 111.453, 100 N.E. 2d607 (1951).
109 373 Ill. 603, 27 N.E. 2d 448 (1940).
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Finally, the much discussed case of People v. Tillman," presents a
very interesting set of facts. In this case, the source of information
initially given to the police officers was not by way of roll call, radio
call, police informer, or the order of a commanding officer. The offi-
cers received an anonymous phone call telling them that in a specific
room at the Grand Hotel there was a man called "Trench Coat" who
was peddling narcotics, and on a previous evening he had sold drugs
to an addict. "Trench Coat" and his woman companion were specifi-
cally described by the caller.
The officers proceeded to the specific room in the Grand Hotel,
and in the hallway outside the door of the room, they found a heavy
set woman meeting the description given to them on the phone. The
door was slightly ajar, so that the officers could see a man lying asleep
upon a bed, and his description also matched the one given in the
phone conversation. The officers arrested the woman, brought her
into the room, and searched her, finding heroin in her robe. They
then awakened the defendant "Trench Coat" on the bed, arrested
him, and found ninety-five capsules of heroin under the mattress. The
Illinois Supreme Court in affirming.the conviction in the lower court
where the arrest was sustained and the motion to suppress denied,
stated:
Finding narcotics on defendant's confederate gave much support to the offi-
cers' belief that Trench Coat was trafficking in narcotics. Certainly, the defend-
ant and his confederate were committing a crime in the presence of the officers,
because without contradiction, they were in possession of, and had under their
control, narcotic drugs in violation of the above section. 1 '
As to the first sentence in the above quotation, under the holding of
the Galloway decision, the mere fact that the officers found narcotics
on the woman who was in the hall, by itself would not have been suf-
ficient to justify the arrest and search of the defendant in the room.
The court did in fact place much reliance on the information received
in the anonymous phone call; it was essential for it to do so to sustain
the arrest of the defendant. The decision, in so far as it allows a deter-
mination of the reasonable belief of the officers at the time of the
arrest to be based upon an anonymous phone call, reaches a new high
in liberality in sustaining an arrest. It is far removed from the require-
ments of a warrant that must be supported by a signed, sworn affidavit
1101 Il. 2d 525, 116 N.E. 2d 344 (1954) cert. denied 348 U.S. 814 (1954); cert. denied
350 U.S. 1009 (1956).
111 Ibid., at 531 and 348.
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based upon personal knowledge. 11 2 Justice Klingbiel in one of the dis-
sents in the case, describes the majority opinion as making a mockery
of the constitutional provision against illegal search and seizure.11 '
As to the second sentence, in the above quotation from the opinion
of the court, to the effect that the defendant and his confederate were
committing a crime in the presence of the officers, it appears to be in
direct derogation of the well-established Illinois rule that the discov-
ery of evidence after an arrest cannot relate back to and operate as a
justification of the arrest. Here, then, there was no evidence that the
narcotics in the robe and under the mattress were seen by the officers
until after the arrest." If the court here means that "presence" does
not require sight or view before arrest, it is saying so for the first time
and it is opening up a new field of arrest, especially in those concealed
weapons cases where the weapon is not discovered until after an in-
valid arrest. Law enforcement and justice would benefit from such an
interpretation.
SEARCH CONDUCTED BY OTHER THAN STATE OFFICERS ACTING
UNDER COLOR OR AUTHORITY FROM THE STATE
Proponents of the exclusionary rule have asserted that its retention
is necessary to preserve the inviolability of an individual's constitu-
tional right against illegal search and seizure. It is submitted that the
decisions do not support the above contention, especially where the
application of the motion to suppress is made to depend upon the
mere fortuitousness of the duty and occupational status of the indi-
vidual conducting the search. Thus in Illinois, on a given set of facts,
if two separate individuals, one a state officer and the other a person
not acting under color or authority from the state, conduct separate
searches in the identical unlawful manner using the exact unlawful
means, the evidence obtained by the latter person will be held not to
be subject to a motion to suppress.
The foregoing is well illustrated by the decision in People v.
Touhy," 5 where an unlawful search based upon mere suspicion was
conducted by officers of the state of Wisconsin. The Illinois Supreme
Court here stated:
112 Authorities cited, notes 19 and 20 supra.
113 People v. Tillman, 1111. 2d 525,116 N.E. 2d 344 (1954).
114 Authorities cited, note 70 supra.
115 361 Ml. 332, 197 N.E. 849 (1935).
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.. The rule in this state is, that where officers of the state charged with the
prosecution of a crime, conduct, by virtue of their office, an unlawful search and
seizure, the evidence there obtained is not admissible against the defendant. The
rule is not applied to evidence unlawfully obtained by others than state officers
acting under color of authority from the state. Likewise the provision of the
Federal Constitution against unlawful search and seizures is not intended as a
limitation upon other governmental agencies. The seizure was not made or au-
thorized by an officer of this state or any agency. The court did not err in deny-
ing the motion to suppress. 116
Similarly, it has been held that where the person who obtained the
evidence was only a private detective acting under a private employ-
ment having no official authority, the evidence was not rendered in-
admissible because of an unlawful search and seizure. Thus the court
in Gindrat v. People"7 held that the Illinois constitutional prohibition
against unreasonable search and seizure is a limitation on the powers
of the state government and has nothing to do with the unauthorized
rights of the private individual, having no authority or color of au-
thority from the state.
It appears improper to hold that the people of the state are to be
penalized in their efforts on behalf of law enforcement because the act
was committed by an employee of the people, while no such penalty
is exacted where the search is conducted by one of their own group.
Justice Cardozo summed up the inconsistency of the above situation
very simply:
The criminal is to go free because the constable has blundered. n 8
In the federal courts it is held that the evidence obtained by an
illegal search and seizure is nevertheless admissible where the search is
made for the purpose of enforcing state law, by state officers without
federal participation. Thus in United States v. Hay wood,"9 where
Chicago police illegally arrested the defendant for a violation of the
Illinois Uniform Narcotics Drug Act, the court stated:
Generally speaking in the federal courts state officers are considered as
strangers as far as the use of evidence procured by search and seizure is con-
cerned; and although search and seizure by state officers may be illegal, if made
entirely independent of any cooperation with federal officers, the evidence
seized is usually admissible in prosecutions in the federal courts. 1 20
So also where a federal officer is involved, the prevailing view is
that evidence obtained by an unlawful search and seizure by federal
116 Ibid., at 347 and 857. "17 138 111. 103, 27 N.E. 1085 (1891).
118 People v. De Fore, 242 N.Y. 13, 21, 150 N.E. 585, 587, (1926).
119 208 F. 2d 156 (C.A. 7th, 1953). 120 Ibid., at 158.
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officers without participation of state and local officers is admissible in
a prosecution in a state court."' The Illinois courts have not had occa-
sion to rule on precisely this factual situation, although in People v.
Dalpe,'22 the evidence was held to be inadmissible where a federal
officer was not only working in conjunction with state police officers
at the time of the search, but in addition led the search and seizure.
The admissibility of evidence and the protection of a citizen's
fundamental constitutional right should not be made to depend upon
the antecedent and wholly unrelated fact that the unreasonable search
by which it was unlawfully obtained was made by a federal officer in-
stead of a city or state policeman. This is not founded in reason or in
law. The city or state policeman takes substantially the same oath to
uphold the law of the land that the federal police officer takes. Con-
cerning this situation, Justice Thompson stated:
... If it is the purpose of the rule to protect the outraged citizen, he is entitled
to the protection under one situation as under the other. The unsoundness of
the rule rests in the erroneous assumption that the people are bound by the
wrongful acts of public police officials employed by their government and that
the people are to be punished for those acts by the courts refusing to receive
evidence illegally obtained. 123
The above examples of distinctions and technical exceptions reveal
the confusion that has arisen in the law because of the presence of the
motion to suppress, which in turn is being rendered valueless by these
same exceptions and distinctions.
CONCLUSION
The spectacle of an obviously guilty defendant obtaining a favor-
able ruling by a court upon a motion to suppress and thereby in effect
obtaining immunity from any successful prosecution of the charge
against him, is a picture which has been too often seen in Illinois prac-
tice. The due administration of criminal law is seriously hampered
and in many cases entirely subverted by a strict adherence to the ex-
clusionary rule. The rule has too often appeared as a tool in the hands
of the criminal element.
If a defendant is innocent or if there is ample evidence to convict
121 See Annotation at 50 A.L.R. 2d 571 (1956). But see also Rea v. United States, 350
U.S. 214 (1956) where in a five to four decision the court held that a federal agent may
be enjoined from testifying in a state court on the basis of evidence obtained by him
under an improper search warrant.
122 371111. 607, 21 N.E. 2d 756 (1939).
123 Dissent in People v. Castree, 311 1. 392,413, 143 N.E. 112, 120 (1924).
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him without the illegally obtained evidence, exclusion of the evidence
gives him no remedy at all. Thus the only defendants who benefit by
the exclusionary rule are those criminals who could not be convicted
without the illegally obtained evidence. Allowing such criminals to
escape punishment is not appropriate recompense for the invasion of
their constitutional rights; it does not punish the officers who violated
the constitutional provisions; it fails to protect society from known
criminals who should not be left at large.
The offending officer should be punished for his violation of the
constitution. As the exclusionary rule operates however, the defend-
ant's crime and the officer's flouting of constitutional guarantees both
go unpunished. Justice Jackson in speaking of the above situation
stated:
Society is deprived of its remedy against one lawbreaker because he has been
pursued by another. The disciplinary or educational effect of the court's releas-
ing the defendant for police misbehavior is so indirect as to be no more than a
mild deterrent at best.1 24
As a matter of practical experience, this writer has had occasion to
listen to instructional lectures given to Chicago police officers wherein
the officers are told that their primary concern and consideration is
not whether or not a conviction in court is obtained, but more impor-
tant is that the narcotics, policy matter, gambling equipment and
other contraband and stolen property are taken from the criminal ele-
ment. The above instruction stems from the many technicalities that
have arisen as a consequence of the application of the motion to-sup-
press which makes it so difficult to obtain a conviction, and thus the
law enforcement officers must concentrate on confiscating the contra-
band, so as to protect the interests of the People of the State in this
worthwhile respect. In many instances it becomes mandatory for the
officers to seize the contraband property immediately, for if they were
to delay to procure a search warrant, or to wait for the defendant to
commit some ancillary technical violation, they would not only lose
the criminal, but the contraband property as well, which property
then remains in the hands of the criminal element and is continued to
be employed for a mephistophelian purpose.
The cost of retaining the exclusionary rule is manifestly too great.
It would be far better for this state to adhere to the non-exclusionary
rule, and if the judiciary does not deem it fit to do so, it is time for the
124 Irvine v. California, 347 U.S. 128 (1954).
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legislature to act. The plain implication of the United States Supreme
Court in Wolf v. Colorado125 is that the federal exclusionary rule is
not a command of the Fourth Amendment but is a judicially created
rule of evidence which Congress might negate. So also in Illinois, the
legislature may and should negate.
In addition the legislature may re-examine the laws concerning the
sanctions to be placed upon illegal searches and seizures. If the present
Illinois law' 26 is deemed inadequate to discourage illegal practices by
enforcement officers, the legislature might well consider the appor-
tionment of damages for such conduct between the governmental
unit employing the officer and the individual officer.127 It might also
consider fixing a minimum amount to be received as damages in the
same manner that a minimum has been fixed for the invasion of other
civil rights. Strong criminal penalties might also be imposed upon
officers and their superiors for violation of the constitutional prohibi-
tion against unlawful search and seizure.
These methods would be far more effective in discouraging illegal
activities on the part of enforcement officers, and at the same time the
abolition of the motion to suppress would discontinue its unjustifiable
obstruction of the process of law enforcement and render inconse-
quential its failure to make proper accommodation for the social inter-
est in effective repression of the criminal elements within the com-
munity.
125 338 U.S. 25 (1949).
126A common-law action for damages is available against officers who conduct an
unlawful search. See Bucher v. Krause, 200 F. 2d 576 (1953), cert. denied 345 U.S. 997.
127 See Karas v. Snell, 11 111. 2d 233, N.E. 2d (1957), in which the court discussed the
fact that under the Revised Cities and Villages Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. [1955], c. 24, §§ 1-15),
the city has indemnifying liability for the acts of its police officers when the injury
caused by the police officer occurs while he is engaged in the performance of his duties
and the injury does not result from the wilful misconduct of the officer.
